Establishing Technological Alliances in the Indo-Pacific: Securing Regional Dynamics through the Quad Act

Julia Na Won Yoon is a graduate student studying Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences (QMSS) at Columbia University. She holds a bachelor's degree from New York University in Politics and Journalism, with a minor in the Business of Entertainment, Media, and Technology (BEMT). Her research interests focus on technology policy research, including artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum computing, telecommunications, space technology, electric vehicles, and more. Julia is passionate about exploring the intersection of technology, policy, and international affairs and plans to pursue a career in political or policy research analysis. She has gained qualitative and quantitative research experiences across various sectors, including think tanks, international organizations, NGOs, and private sectors.

Abstract: Amidst the turbulent geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. Congress recently introduced “Strengthening the Quad Act" to bolster the power of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD). Informally known as “the Quad,” the QSD is a partnership of four countries—the U.S., India, Australia, and Japan—to strengthen their democratic resilience and cooperative relationship in the Indo-Pacific. This paper explores how technological alliances within the Quad Act can reshape power dynamics and the regional landscape in the Indo-Pacific. It will outline the history of technological collaboration and ongoing cooperative research efforts between the United States and each of the Quad member countries and explore the broader geopolitical shifts in the Indo-Pacific by emphasizing the critical role of technological cooperation. The Quad's efforts include joint academic research, technological development partnerships, and goals to solve workforce shortage problems in high tech industries. These efforts are crucial for jointly addressing national security concerns and fostering economic resilience in the region.

What is the Quad Act?

The partners initially assembled in 2004 as a humanitarian effort to assist in the aftermath of the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami.[1] Initially conceived as a disaster relief coalition, the four nations soon dissolved the Quad after it accomplished its intended mission quickly. In 2007, the Quad attempted to revive by initiating their informal meeting during the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Manila.[2] However, the countries had relatively less political will to reassemble the group, preventing them from pursuing the partnership's revival. Entering the 2010s, China’s growing economic and military power demonstrated a departure from the security status quo in the Asia-Pacific region. The former Quad powers in the region called for closer cooperation in security, public health, and critical technology concerns—as they shared democratic values and economic interests and might serve as a bulwark against China.

The modern form of the Quad was revitalized during the 2017 ASEAN Summit in Manila to foster diplomatic ties among participating nations amidst the disruptions caused by China in the Indo-Pacific region. Since its revival in 2017, the four members have grown closer, particularly in promoting cooperative military practices and strategic assistance in the Indo-Pacific region. The shared interest among the member states not only lies in reinforcing national security in the Indo-Pacific region but also extends to strengthening their technological and innovation partnership. However, despite some earlier commitments, science and technology cooperation among the Quad countries was limited to specific sectors such as space and vaccines. The Quad Act and its comprehensive approach integrate technological coercion among the countries, underscoring the necessity of collaborative scientific research and development (R&D) in critical and emerging technologies and emphasizing the joint commitment to progress and mutual prosperity.

Introduced in September 2023 and passed in early 2024, the "Strengthening the Quad Act" was introduced by Democrat Representative Gregory Meeks (NY), a House Foreign Affairs Committee ranking member.[3] The newly introduced Quad Act is designed to reinforce democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific region through economic and national security cooperation. The strategy addressed cooperation on issues including (1) preparing for the next pandemic, (2) co-developing new innovative technologies, and (3) deepening economic engagement and integration. The bill requires the State Department to submit a developed strategy to increase engagement and cooperation with the Quad to Congress within 180 days of the bill’s enactment. Within 60 days of its enactment, the State Department needs to enter negotiations with Japan, Australia, and India to eventually establish a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group that promotes and encourages a more detailed, closer partnership among the four countries. The U.S. working group has a maximum of 24 members of Congress to represent the U.S. side, drafting guidelines for annual meetings and group leadership. The bill requires the group to submit an annual report to the congressional foreign affairs committees.

Before the Quad Act, the U.S. also launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) in May 2022 with a dozen partners across the region that focus on strengthening ties and combating potential economic challenges.[4]Including the Quad countries and some other major powers in the region like the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam, the framework fuels economic activity and foreign direct investment, promotes sustainable growth, and benefits workers and consumers. In March 2024, the U.S. released the IPEF Overarching Agreement for Prosperity and other economy pillar agreements that further recognize collaborative commitments in stable and interconnected economic relations and better flows.[5] Combined with the Quad Act, the U.S.’s effort to bring the Indo-Pacific countries together has been reinforced multiple times, along with the emphasis on democratic resilience and mutual economic prosperity in the region.

Importance of Technological Cooperation

Entering the 21st century, the ability to creatively apply and develop advanced technologies has been critical for the economic growth and national security of a country.[6] Countries are no longer relying solely on their own resources to compete in the global market but rather growing their expertise through innovation and technological partnerships. The U.S. has been reinforcing the critical connection between advanced technology and national security through the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)'s export controls on Chinese flash memory chips and the CHIPS Act. As this effort intensifies, strategic and technological alliances with like-minded democratic countries have become more crucial.[7]

Multiple approaches, including the IPEF and the Quad partnership, serve as important legislative steps that underscore the critical role of technology cooperation in expanding integrated economies. By fostering strategic relationships within the advanced technology ecosystem, the Quad Act also represents a multilateral effort to strengthen the democratic resilience among the Indo-Pacific major powers against economic and geopolitical threats in the region. Development initiatives and joint research projects to promote innovation and critical and emerging technologies enhance the collective capacity of the Quad members. This enhanced collective capacity helps the Quad members navigate through the complex landscape, including geopolitical stability, economic growth and integration, national security resilience, and emerging challenges. Having a powerful, advanced technological infrastructure will protect the interest of the Quad nations amidst shifting geopolitical dynamics, upholding their shared democratic values.

Geopolitical Stability. Collaborative efforts in technological development can lead countries to build stronger diplomatic ties among the nations. By engaging in joint academic research and developmental projects in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, and space technology, countries can put in initiatives to build a more stable relationship with mutual trust and understanding. Including the U.S., many countries continue to use science diplomacy as a soft power tool in international security cooperation.[8] Sharing sensitive and powerful expertise in technology with allies and partners can mitigate potential political tensions, promote peaceful resolutions during disputes, and strengthen strategic partnerships among the Quad members in the Indo-Pacific region. This interdependence among countries fostered through technological cooperation can maintain productive relationships and contribute to a more stable geopolitical environment.

Economic Integration. Technology cooperation has the potential to generate innovation and economic expansion across the Indo-Pacific region. This holds particularly true for developing countries like India, which has substantial economic strength and growing human capital but may lag in advanced technology power. Multinational technological corporations strategically locate different steps of their operations—research, product development, manufacturing, warehousing—throughout various countries based on market access, infrastructure, geography, and human resources.[9] By strategically allocating experts and resources to increase productivity and create new industries, these developing democratic nations, including India and potentially other Southeast Asian countries in the future, can have their competitiveness in the global market. Facilitating the economic integration of different democratic nations into the international market is crucial since it can serve as a vital initial step for them to flourish and eventually improve their political stability and national prosperity.

National Security Resilience. The U.S.'s technological innovation power has advanced both its military capabilities and economic prosperity, playing a crucial role in shaping the country's influence during the last century.[10] Since promoting technological cooperation among multiple nations can encourage investment and development of the most advanced technologies, these collaborative efforts in research and development enable countries to lead scientific innovation in the world. Leading cutting-edge technologies that reflect the interests of multiple nations can contribute to maintaining national stability. Besides, the Quad countries can collectively address emerging security threats and adapt to changing geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific by sharing expertise in cybersecurity, surveillance technologies, and defense systems. Through strategic partnerships in emerging technology, they can build a robust security environment that protects their sovereignty and promotes stability in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

Past Technological Partnership of the United States and Japan

During the 2010s, the U.S. and Japan both witnessed the potential threat posed by China's rising assertiveness. As the fourth largest trading partner of the U.S. and the largest source of foreign direct investment into the country, Japan and the U.S. maintained close political and economic ties with each other.[11] The scientific and technological partnership between the two countries spans more than 25 years, conducting joint research and development in areas like new energy technologies, medical science, supercomputing, space, and critical materials.[12] However, the legacy of economic rivalry between the U.S. and Japan three decades ago still cast a shadow, making it difficult for them to effectively leverage their shared concerns over China while safeguarding their own critical technological interests at the same time.

In 2022, the U.S. and Japan announced the Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership, outlining plans for close cooperation in essential innovation and technology areas.[13] The partnership covers joint work on the digital economy, 5G and Open RAN infrastructures, cybersecurity, civil space, and resilient supply chains for semiconductors and critical minerals. Notably, it highlighted their shared goal of strategic coordination in the Indo-Pacific region, focusing on regional diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives. Japan also established 'Rapidus' in 2022, a center for mass-producing next-generation semiconductors. Partnering with U.S. firm IBM and backed by billions in government investment, Rapidus is building new semiconductor fabs in Hokkaido while sending researchers to IBM's Albany, NY research center.[14] This growing U.S.-Japan technological partnership holds significance for the broader Quad relationship involving Australia and India in advanced technology industries such as semiconductors and Open RAN.

Past Technological Partnership of the United States and Australia

The strong technological partnership between the U.S. and Australia underscores the Quad’s cooperation in emerging technologies and economic resilience. With more than 80 years of a steadfast relationship, the two countries have developed influential ties in many sectors with particular attention to protecting the national and economic security of countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Including the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security partnership and the U.S.-Australia Force Posture Agreement at the annual Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN), joint military exercises upheld regional security.[15] Their collaboration extends to critical areas such as space, health, and advanced technologies.

In October 2023, the U.S.-Australia Technology Safeguards Agreement facilitated joint space launches while protecting sensitive data.[16] The U.S. pledged support for Australian domestic launch capabilities and spaceports, recognizing Australia's growing space prowess. This bolsters the Quad's to open and secure the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, Australia's technology sector advantages make it an invaluable Quad partner. The country attracted major U.S. tech companies like Microsoft, one of the leading AI and technology companies. Microsoft announced its plan to invest USD $3 billion for local cloud computing centers and research infrastructures in its Australia site over time, potentially attracting and training 300,000 local workers.[17] With strong economic ties as the U.S.'s third largest trading partner, Australia has a stable market and investment environment for critical technologies. Its democratic values and location further reinforce the Quad’s cooperation on technological development and economic resilience against systemic risks in the Indo-Pacific.

Past Technological Partnership of the United States and India

India's deepening technological partnership with the U.S. strengthens the Quad's collective capabilities in emerging technologies, workforce development, and economic resilience. Their active bilateral cooperation recently is mainly to fulfill each other's weaknesses—workforce for the U.S. and cutting-edge technological innovation for India. In 2022, the two leaders, President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, jointly announced the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) that promotes strategic relationships in the advanced technology ecosystem and supply chain resilience under shared democratic values.[18] This was followed by the 2023 Strategic Trade Dialogue that addresses technology transfer and export control as well as their future goals to augment academic collaboration in science and technology fields. The statement specifically stresses the importance of technology sharing and co-developing cutting-edge innovations in space, AI, telecommunications, quantum, and semiconductor industries, potentially leading to cooperation in developing defense and cutting-edge technologies that are sensitive to national security. Besides, the 2023 Semiconductor Supply Chain and Innovation Partnership aims to boost semiconductor R&D, manufacturing, and supply chain resilience by promoting commercial opportunities and U.S. private investment in India.[19] Private investment by American firms in India surged from $2.4 billion in 2000 to $51.6 billion by 2022.[20]

India is one of the fastest-growing countries in this century, and it offers some key advantages to drive the Quad’s technological cooperation. Its rapidly growing economy and skilled workforce, especially young engineers, can solve the Quad’s workforce issues in semiconductor industries and tech industry growth. Its motivated youth engineers are expected to help facilitate the semiconductor supply chain resilience of the U.S. and its allies. Following the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act allocating $2 billion to chip companies and factories, India has announced incentive programs for semiconductor fabrication units and facility modernization. The strengthening partnership between the U.S. and India represents their shared commitment and mutual interests in advancing cutting-edge technology in the Indo-Pacific region. As collaboration deepens through the Quad Act, particularly in defense technologies and the latest academic research, both countries are poised to address critical challenges and invest in innovation for securing international power.

India's growing academic collaboration with U.S. universities cultivates a pipeline for cutting-edge research. Initiatives like the India-U.S. Global Challenges Institute facilitate student exchanges and joint projects across engineering, health, and other critical domains. As democratic partners, the U.S. and India share a commitment to support an open and resilient Indo-Pacific region. Their deepening cooperation in defense R&D and emerging technologies enhances the Quad’s capabilities vis-a-vis rivals while addressing shared challenges through technological innovation.

Challenges of the Quad Act

Despite the Quad Act’s crucial role as a cooperative bridge among the four countries in the Indo-Pacific, challenges and limitations of the Act still exist. First, the current restrictions on labor mobility in the U.S. can hinder expert or talent exchange across borders. Easing these restrictions, especially for university and academic researchers, lab technicians, and advanced technology engineers in varying STEM fields will allow a facilitated environment for more active research collaborations without facing bureaucratic hurdles. The situation is especially crucial to the U.S. advanced technology workforce, given that over 40% of the doctorate-level science and engineering (S&E) workforce is composed of individuals born outside the U.S.[21] Moreover, nearly 60% of doctorate-level computer scientists, mathematical scientists, and engineers employed are foreign-born.[22] The Quad countries, including the U.S., can jointly work to lower administrative immigration or visa processes for high-tech workers, where the amount of time required to transfer skilled professionals to certain countries can be reduced. Developing policies for smoother talent transitions is crucial for balancing and mitigating workforce challenges.

Second, coordination challenges are still a big hurdle. Potential shifts in administration in the U.S. and India this year can challenge proactive efforts for long-term cooperation and implement the objectives of the Quad partnership. Permanent institutions that carry out the Quad’s different policy agendas could potentially reduce coordination issues. An example of this could be the establishment and maintenance of a collaborative scientific research grant agency involving key governmental bodies to assist joint research endeavors. For example, the European Union's research and innovation funding program, Horizon Europe, promotes collaboration in research partnerships and supports technology policy implementation.[23] Similarly, the National Science Foundation (NSF) in the U.S., the Department of Science and Technology in India, the Department of Industry, Science and Resources in Australia, and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) in Japan can potentially develop a joint grant-making body that could fund cross-national and joint scientific research. Such initiatives can focus on funding international partnership research projects, encouraging technological knowledge exchange, and setting internationally shared technology standards.

Conclusion

The Quad Act represents a crucial step in strengthening strategic and technological cooperation among the democratic nations to address shared challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite escalating tensions as China's economic and political influence grows, the Quad partnership among the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India is reinforcing efforts to promote regional stability, economic integration, and security resilience. Continued coordination through joint research projects, talent exchanges, and aligned policies for emerging technology fields like AI, semiconductors, quantum computing, and space technology will be important when overcoming bureaucratic hurdles and supporting the Quad's long-term commitment. By fostering innovation ecosystems along with public-private partnerships and dedicated funding processes, the Quad can initiate technological advancements that protect shared democratic values while opening economic opportunities. This technological partnership has the potential to reshape geopolitical dynamics and solidify the Indo-Pacific's position as a hub for open economic growth.

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ENDNOTES

[1] Patrick Gerard Buchan, and Benjamin Rimland. “Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 16, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue.

[2] Ibid.

[3]  Strengthening the Quad Act, H.R.5375, 118th Cong. (2023-2024), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/5375/text.

[4] U.S. Department of Commerce. “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.” U.S. Department of Commerce, March 14, 2024. https://www.commerce.gov/ipef.

[5] U.S. Department of Commerce. “Agreement on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.” U.S. Department of Commerce, March 14, 2024. https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/IPEF-Overarching-Agreement.pdf.

[6] Simon Ramo. “National Security and Our Technology Edge.” Harvard Business Review, 1989. https://hbr.org/1989/11/national-security-and-our-technology-edge.

[7] Bureau of Industry and Security. “Commerce Implements New Export Controls on Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).” U.S. Department of Commerce, October 7, 2022. https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3158-2022-10-07-bis-press-release-advanced-computing-and-semiconductor-manufacturing-controls-final/file.

[8] James Kadtke, and John Wharton. “Technology and National Security: The United States at a Critical Crossroads.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 2018. https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/defensehorizon/DH-84.pdf.

[9] Simon Ramo. “National Security and Our Technology Edge.”

[10] John H. Gibbons. “National Security and the Role of Science and Technology.” JSTOR, Spring 1996. https://www.jstor.org/stable/45345321.

[11] Congressional Research Service. “U.S.-Japan Relations.” Congressional Research Service Reports, March 27, 2024. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10199.

[12] U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. “U.S. Relations With Japan.” U.S. Department of State, January 21, 2020. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-japan/.

[13] The White House Briefing Room. “FACT SHEET: The U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership.” The White House, May 23, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-the-u-s-japan-competitiveness-and-resilience-core-partnership/.

[14] Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell. “Japan Seeks to Revitalize Its Semiconductor Industry.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 25, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/japan-seeks-revitalize-its-semiconductor-industry.

[15] U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesperson. “The United States-Australia Relationship.” U.S. Department of State, July 27, 2023. https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-australia-relationship/.

[16] Australian Government Department of Industry, Science and Resources. “Australia and US Formalise Technology Safeguards Agreement.” Australian Government Department of Industry, Science and Resources, October 27, 2023. https://www.industry.gov.au/news/australia-and-us-formalise-technology-safeguards-agreement#:~:text=The%20Technology%20Safeguards%20Agreement%20(TSA,visit%20to%20the%20United%20States.

[17] Microsoft News Center. “Microsoft Announces A$5 Billion Investment in Computing Capacity and Capability to Help Australia Seize the AI Era.” Microsoft Australia News Centre, October 24, 2023. https://news.microsoft.com/en-au/features/microsoft-announces-a5-billion-investment-in-computing-capacity-and-capability-to-help-australia-seize-the-ai-era/.

[18] The White House Briefing Room. “Joint Statement from the United States and India.” The White House, June 29, 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/06/22/joint-statement-from-the-united-states-and-india/.

[19] U.S. Department of Commerce. “Secretary Raimondo Announces U.S.-India Semiconductor Supply Chain and Innovation Partnership MOU in New Delhi.” U.S. Department of Commerce, March 15, 2023. https://www.commerce.gov/news/blog/2023/03/secretary-raimondo-announces-us-india-semiconductor-supply-chain-and-innovation.

[20] Hideki Tomoshige. “The Strategic Convergence of the U.S.-India Innovation Partnership.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 22, 2023. https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/strategic-convergence-us-india-innovation-partnership-0.

[21] National Science Board. “Talent: U.S. and Global STEM Education and Labor Force.” National Science Foundation, 2024. https://ncses.nsf.gov/.

[22] National Science Board. “Talent: U.S. and Global STEM Education and Labor Force.” National Science Foundation, 2024. https://ncses.nsf.gov/.

[23] European Commission. “Horizon Europe.” European Commission. Accessed April 21, 2024. https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe_en.